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Abstract
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require-
ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet
the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control
change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-
agent model where control signals the expectations of the principal
and the agent meets these expectations because he is guilt-averse. We
conjecture that control is more likely to be considered legitimate (i) if
it is not exclusively aimed at a specific agent or (ii) if it protects the
endowment of the principal. Given the conjecture, the model predicts
that hidden costs are lower when one of the two conditions is met. We
experimentally test these predictions and find them confirmed.
JEL C7, C9, M5
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What would, under ordinary circumstances, be justly condemned
as persecution, may fall within the bounds of legitimate selfde-
fence.
Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England, 1849.
1 Introduction
Is it a good idea for a firm to impose minimum effort requirements? Control-
ling workers in this way has a positive direct effect: workers can no longer
shirk. However, there may be a more subtle indirect effect: workers who
already meet the requirement can also react to control, possibly by reduc-
ing effort. In a recent experimental study, Armin Falk and Michael Kosfeld
(2006, henceforth F&K) demonstrate that the overall effect can be negative.
Their result shows that subjects exert less effort when they are controlled.
While F&K conclude from this finding that there are hidden costs of control,
little is known about their extent and the circumstances under which they
occur. Here, we show that hidden costs of control depend on whether control
is legitimate. When it is legitimate, hidden costs are reduced.
The following example illustrates what we mean by “legitimate.” Accord-
ing to the 2005 Internet Usage Study, about 78% of workers accessed the in-
ternet for unproductive purposes such as personal use or entertainment while
at work.1 Most employers seem to be aware of this problem and do not shy
1The information is from a press release of Bursteck on Business Wire Inc., March
2006.
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away from monitoring the usage of internet and e-mail.2 However, they often
justify this step. As an example take the following quote from the Verizon
Code of Conduct (2001):3
”Sometimes it is necessary to monitor employee personal commu-
nications or computer usage or to search employee workspaces for
the protection of employees, company assets and other legitimate
business reasons. [The company] retains the right to monitor per-
sonal communications or computer usage or to search any and all
computer property at any time, including, but not limited to, of-
fices, desks, lockers, bags, vehicles, e-mail, voice mail, pagers, ...
[company] telephone usage records and computer files.”
This justification encompasses two key elements. First, control is a general
policy and does not target a specific employee. Second, control prevents loss
of or damage to company assets. Both issues may play a role in assuring
the understanding of the worker and reducing the hidden costs of control. In
line with this intuition, we put forth a legitimacy conjecture: control is more
likely to be regarded as legitimate
1. if control is not aimed at a specific individual or
2. if it protects the endowment of the person who controls.
2The Michigan Lawyers Weekly reports on the 14th of August 2006 from the 2005 Elec-
tronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey that about 75% of employers monitor employee
internet connections and about 55% store and monitor their e-mail.
3The quote is also from the aforementioned article.
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While the concept of “legitimacy” has a long tradition in political science
and sociology,4 it has, to our knowledge, not yet been studied in economics.
Our legitimacy conjecture is a first step in this direction.
We provide a simple principal-agent model to formalize the consequence
of this conjecture on hidden costs. The model builds on the game that F&K
examine experimentally. The principal (firm, she) can decide whether to
control or not. Then, the agent (employee, he) decides on effort. Control
rules out effort below an exogenously given threshold level.
F&K suggest that hidden costs arise in this game because control signals
a lack of trust. If the principal does not trust the agent, i.e. expects little
effort of him, F&K anticipate that the agent exerts little effort as a result.
We model this by using the theory of guilt-aversion proposed by Martin
Dufwenberg and Gary Charness (2006) and Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin
Dufwenberg (2007). A guilt-averse agent exerts as much effort as he believes
the principal expects from him because he would feel that he was letting the
principal down if he exerted less effort.
The presence of the guilt-averse agent turns the game into a dynamic
psychological game in which the utility of the agent depends on his own
beliefs.5 We analyze this game and find two types of equilibrium: open-
door equilibria where the principal does not control because otherwise she
would incur hidden costs (Proposition 1) and closed-door equilibria where
4For example, Max Weber (1947) describes different types of legitimacy as sources of
governmental power.
5The theory of dynamic psychological games has been developed by Pierpaolo Battigalli
and Martin Dufwenberg (2007), who build on the framework of John Geanakoplos, David
Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti (1989).
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the principal controls and there are no hidden costs (Proposition 2). The
type of equilibrium depends on the agent’s beliefs.
The agent’s beliefs also reflect whether he regards control to be legitimate
or not. If control is not legitimate in the eyes of the agent, the principal
cannot expect him to exert the same effort under control as he would under
no control. Accordingly, the agent’s belief about the principal’s expectation
is lower when under control than it is when under no control. On the other
hand, the principal has no reason to expect less effort from the agent if
the agent regards control to be legitimate. In this case, the agent’s belief
about the principal’s expectations remains at least the same under control as
under no control. In summary, the agent believes that the principal expects
the same or more effort under control if (and only if) control is legitimate
in the eyes of the agent. Legitimacy thus restricts beliefs. An immediate
consequence of this restriction is that hidden costs occur if and only if control
is not legitimate (Proposition 3).
Given this model, the legitimacy conjecture yields two testable predic-
tions. Hidden costs of control should be smaller if control is not exclusively
aimed at the agent or if control protects the principal’s endowment. We test
these predictions in an experiment with three treatments. In the baseline
treatment, control is exclusively aimed at the agent and does not protect the
principal’s endowment. The second treatment differs from the baseline treat-
ment in that control is not exclusively aimed at the subject in the role of the
agent but also restricts a selfish computerized agent. The third treatment
deviates from the baseline treatment in that control protects the principal’s
endowment. We estimate hidden costs in all treatments and find that they
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are significantly lower if control is also targeted at the computerized agent
or if it protects the principal’s endowment.
These findings contribute to the literature on the psychological effects of
incentives.6 It has been documented that material incentives may back-fire
if psychological incentives are not taken into account.7 Our findings shed
light on the important question of when material incentives work and when
they do not work. The model that we develop contributes to recent liter-
ature that explains why incentives may “crowd out” employee motivation.
It has been suggested that incentives may be a signal from the principal to
the agent about the agent’s costs (Roland Be´nabou and Jean Tirole 2003),
about a social norm (Dirk Sliwka 2007), about the commitment of co-workers
(Guido Friebel and Wendelin Schnedler 2007), or about the character of the
principal (Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson 2007). The complemen-
tary explanation provided here is that incentives are informative about the
expectations of the principal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we offer
a model of hidden costs of control and in Section 3, we analyze it. Then,
in Section 4, we define legitimacy and examine its consequences on hidden
costs. In Section 5 we present our conjecture, derive testable predictions and
propose treatments to test them. Section 6 presents our results. Finally,
Section 7 summarizes our findings.
6This literature (for an overview see Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk 2002) incorporates a
richer description of the agent’s motivation in terms of equity (Ernst Fehr and Klaus
Schmidt 1999) and reciprocity (Matthew Rabin 1993, Martin Dufwenberg and Georg
Kirchsteiger 2004 and Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher 2006).
7see for example Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (2000a, 2000b)
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2 Modeling Hidden Costs of Control
As a starting point, consider the game from the main treatment by F&K
(C10). In this game, there is a principal (she) and an agent (he). The
agent is endowed with pi0A = 120 points and the principal has no endowment,
pi0P = 0. First, the principal decides whether to impose a minimum effort
requirement x = 10, i.e. she can control the agent y = x or not y = 0.
Second, the agent decides how much effort, x, to exert, where x is an integer
between y and the endowment of 120. The strategy of the agent is a pair
(xc, xnc) that specifies an effort choice when the principal controls and when
she does not control. Each unit of effort costs the agent x and increases the
payoff of the principal by 2 · x. Hence there are efficiency gains if the agent
exerts effort. The monetary payoffs are:
pi1A(y, x) = pi
0
A − x for the agent and (1)
pi1P(y, x) = pi
0
P + 2 · x for the principal. (2)
We can distinguish two effects of control:
Definition 1 (Direct and indirect effect of control) The direct effect of
control forces the agent to supply at least the required benchmark, x. The in-
direct effect of control reflects any other response by the agent.8
The indirect effect captures the consequences on the principal’s payoff due
to the agent’s psychological reaction to control. A particular interesting case
is when this effect is negative.
8Mathematically, the direct effect on the principal’s payoff amounts to 2 · (x − xnc) if
xnc < x and zero else. The indirect effect is the overall effect, 2 · (xc − xnc), minus the
direct effect. It can be more succinctly written as 2 · (xc −max{x, xnc}).
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Definition 2 (Hidden costs of control) There are hidden costs of con-
trol if and only if the indirect effect of control is negative.
Later, we estimate direct, indirect, and overall effect using the data from our
treatments and test for the presence of hidden costs.
In light of these definitions, the finding by F&K that control leads to
lower effort has three implications. First, there is an indirect effect of control.
Second, this effect is negative, i.e. there are hidden costs of control; and third,
it outweighs the direct effect of control.
F&K suggest that hidden costs arise because control signals a lack of
trust. If the principal does not trust the agent, i.e. expects little effort of
him, the agent exerts little effort. The idea that control signals distrust can
be formalized using the theory of guilt-aversion.9 A guilt-averse agent exerts
as much effort as the principal expects since otherwise he would suffer from
feeling guilty.
Suppose the principal expects the agent to supply a certain level of effort
when she controls and a possibly different level when she does not control.
In other words, the principal has some first-order belief about effort which
depends on control. Further, suppose that the agent has a second-order
belief:10 he has an estimate of the principal’s expectations given that the
principal controls, µc, and given that the principal does not control, µnc.
The utility of a guilt-averse agent depends not only on monetary payoffs
but also on his belief about what the principal expects him to do. Formally,
9For a formal and more complete introduction to guilt-aversion see the articles by Mar-
tin Dufwenberg and Gary Charness 2006 and Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin Dufwenberg,
2007)
10Higher order beliefs could be defined accordingly but are not needed for our analysis.
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we denote the guilt felt by the agent when he thinks the principal expects µ
and he supplies x with G(µ, x) := max{0, 2 · (µ− x)}. Let θ ≥ 1/2 describe
the degree of guilt-aversion of the agent,11 then the overall utility for the
agent from monetary payoff and guilt is:
uA (y, (x
nc, xc) | (µc, µnc)) = pi1A
(
y, xi
)− θ ·G(µi, xi), (3)
where i = c if the principal controls and i = nc else. For simplicity, we
assume that the principal only cares about her monetary payoffs.
3 Analysis
The introduction of the guilt-averse agent leads to two equilibria (respective
proofs are in Appendix A.2).
Proposition 1 (Open-door equilibrium) There is an open-door equilib-
rium where the principal does not control (y = 0) and the agent’s effort
matches the agent’s beliefs (xnc = µnc, xc = µc) if and only if the agent’s
beliefs satisfy:
µnc − µc ≥ 0. (4)
As the agent matches expectations, effort under no control is always larger
than or equal to effort under control. In the open-door equilibrium, the
indirect effect of control may hence be negative and control can entail hidden
costs.
11If θ < 1/2 marginal costs of exerting effort always exceed the marginal guilt and
guilt-averse agents act like selfish agents.
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Proposition 2 (Closed-door equilibrium) There is a closed-door equi-
librium where the principal controls (y = x) and the agent’s effort matches
the agent’s beliefs (xnc = µnc, xc = µc) if and only if the agent’s beliefs satisfy:
µnc − µc ≤ 0. (5)
In this second equilibrium, the indirect effect cannot be negative and control
does not lead to hidden costs. Which equilibrium arises depends on the initial
beliefs of principal and agent. In the next section, we examine these beliefs
and their relation to legitimacy more closely.
4 Legitimacy
Legitimacy itself is a broad concept. The Oxford English Dictionary lists
twelve different definitions of “legitimate.”12 Here, we focus on one particular
but crucial aspect of legitimacy: its consequence on the agent’s beliefs.
Consider a guilt-averse agent who provides more than the required effort
in the absence of control: xnc > x. This agent is not affected directly by
control. However, he could be affected indirectly. On the one hand, if the
agent does not consider control to be legitimate, the principal cannot expect
his effort under control to match or exceed the effort when she does not
control. Accordingly, the agent’s beliefs about the principal’s expectations
are lower under control: µnc > µc. On the other hand, if the agent regards
control to be legitimate, the principal can expect to get at least the same
12The most relevant definition for our purposes is in line with the initial quote from
Macaulay and reads “conformable to law or rule.” Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition,
1989, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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effort under control as under no control and the agent believes that the
principal’s expectations are not lower under control: µnc ≤ µc. The following
definition reflects this intuition.
Definition 3 (Legitimate Control) Control is regarded to be legitimate
by the agent if and only if his beliefs about the principal’s expectation are at
least as high under control as when under no control: µc ≥ µnc.
In psychological games, the source of initial beliefs is un-modeled. Our def-
inition of legitimacy structures these beliefs and is closely related to hidden
costs of control.
Proposition 3 (Legitimacy and Hidden Costs) There are hidden costs
of control if and only if the agent does not regard control as legitimate.
The proof follows immediately from the observation that the agent’s actions
meet the principal’s expectations (see Lemma 1 in the appendix). It is thus
valid as long as the principal has the choice between control and no control
and the agent’s utility and cost function are as previously specified.
If control is not legitimate then the closed-door equilibrium does not
exist, we are only left with the open-door equilibrium, and control entails
hidden costs. However, we have not yet addressed the question under what
circumstances the agent regards control to be legitimate and will do so in
the following section.
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5 Hypotheses and Treatments
Whether an individual regards control to be legitimate may vary between
individuals and depend on the context in which control is applied. Our
starting point is the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 (Legitimacy Conjecture) Control is more likely to be con-
sidered legitimate
1. if it is not exclusively aimed at a particular agent or
2. if it protects the endowment of the principal.
Within our model, the legitimacy conjecture yields two testable predictions:
hidden costs of control should be lower if control is not targeted at a specific
agent or if it protects the principal against theft. Next, we suggest two
variations of the aforementioned game in order to test these predictions.
For comparison, we replicate the C10 treatment by F&K as our BASE-
LINE treatment. Our second treatment (ROBOT) varies the BASELINE in
that the principal is no longer certain to be matched with a human subject.
With a probability of one half, she is matched with a computerized agent
that always chooses the smallest possible effort, i.e. x = 0 under no control
and x = 10 under control. Accordingly, the payoffs to the principal are 0
under no control and 20 under control. If the principal interacts with the
computerized agent, the human agent is not affected by this and keeps his
endowment. When deciding on control, the principal does not know whether
she is matched with the human or with the computerized agent. Control is
hence not exclusively aimed at the human agent. According to our conjec-
ture, more subjects should consider control to be legitimate in the ROBOT
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treatment than in the BASELINE treatment. Applying Proposition 3, we
obtain the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Control leads to lower hidden costs in the ROBOT than in
the BASELINE treatment.
Our third treatment (ENDOWMENT) differs from the BASELINE treat-
ment in that the agent has the possibility to take from the principal. The
only difference is that effort is labeled differently. While in the BASELINE
treatment effort ranges from zero to 120 and the minimum requirement is
10, effort in the ENDOWMENT treatment is between −10 and 110 and the
minimum requirement is 0. If the agent neither takes nor gives, the principal
has an endowment of pi0P = 20 and the agent of pi
0
A = 110. In the EN-
DOWMENT treatment, control protects the principal’s initial endowment.
So, if the legitimacy conjecture holds, Proposition 3 implies the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Control leads to lower hidden costs in the ENDOWMENT
than in the BASELINE treatment.
In order to test our hypotheses, we ran a total of 12 sessions: 4 for each treat-
ment. All sessions were conducted in the experimental laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim. Subjects were primarily undergraduate students who
were randomly recruited from a pool of approximately 1000 subjects using
an e-mail recruitment system. Each subject only participated in one of the
treatments. The software was written in Visual Basic 6 and the experiment
lasted approximately 60 minutes (including time for reading the instructions
and receiving payments).
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After the subjects arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly and
anonymously matched in pairs and seated at the computer terminals. They
were handed instructions (included in the appendix) and given 15 to 20 min-
utes to study them. After everyone had finished reading, they were asked to
complete a series of questions designed to verify their understanding of the
experiment. Once all questions had been answered successfully, the exper-
iment began. The game was not repeated: each subject only had to make
one decision. Subjects in the role of the principal had to decide whether to
control or not. For subjects in the role of the agent, we used the strategy
method to elicit their decisions: the subjects had to decide on the effort level
under control and no control. The strategy method is used because it allows
us to identify hidden costs of control even if the behavior of principals shows
little variation. For example, we learn what agents would have done under
no control even if all principals control. At the end of the experiment, we
paid each subject privately in cash. All material payoffs were explained in
points that were converted using the rate that 1 point=10 cents. Subjects
received a show-up fee of e4 and their total earnings were on average about
e10 for the whole experiment.
6 Results
Our first finding replicates an important aspect of the work by Falk and
Kosfeld (2006).
Result 1 In the BASELINE treatment, control entails hidden costs.
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The left panel in Figure 1 shows the distribution of effort choices un-
der control and no control. The distribution under control is stochastically
smaller. This indicates that a sizeable fraction of subjects provides more ef-
fort in the absence of control. The right panel in the same figure depicts the
distribution of the individual difference between the effort under control and
without control for each subject. It shows that around 37% of the subjects
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of effort (left panel) and of within-subject
differences in effort choices for the BASELINE treatment
give less when they are controlled and 18% reduce their effort by ten points
or more.
When we estimate the indirect effect of control on effort,13 we find that
it amounts to −6.88 points. On average, principals thus incur hidden costs
13The indirect effect is estimated by replacing xc and max{xnc, x} with the respective
sample means of the variables. We test whether there are hidden costs by checking whether
the median of the distribution of xc is smaller than the median of max{xnc, x}. F&K do
not explicitly define ”hidden costs” but use the same testing procedure to test whether
control has a ”behavioral impact.”
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of about 7 points when controlling. Is this loss statistically significant? In
line with Falk and Kosfeld (2006), we find that hidden costs of control are
significant (two-sided exact Wilcoxon signed rank test has a p-value below
0.001). In the BASELINE treatment, the direct effect amounts to 8.31 points
so that the overall effect is 8.31−6.88 = 1.43; we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the overall effect is zero (The two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test has
a p-value of 0.38). So, we cannot replicate the finding of F&K that the
principal is worse off if she controls.
After having established the existence of costs of control, we now address
our main hypotheses by examining how these costs change across treatments.
Result 2 Hidden costs of control are significantly lower in the ROBOT than
in the BASELINE treatment.
In the ROBOT treatment one-third of the subjects voluntarily exert an
effort above the minimum requirement even if they are not controlled. The
left panel in Figure 2 illustrates that agents still choose higher effort in the
absence of control, while the right panel indicates that the differences between
effort under control and in the absence of control are considerably larger in
the ROBOT treatment than in the BASELINE treatment. In the ROBOT
treatment, only 9% of the subjects choose to exert less effort under control
while about 37% do so in the BASELINE treatment. Likewise, the share of
subjects who “punish” control by reducing effort by 10 or more points drops
from 18% in the BASELINE to only 6% in the ROBOT treatment. The
estimate for the indirect effect of control amounts to −2.06 points. While
control still leads to hidden costs, they are no longer significantly different
16
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of effort for the ROBOT treatment (left
panel) and of the differences in effort choices for each subject in the BASE-
LINE and ROBOT treatment (right panel)
from zero (the one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test has p-value of 0.78).
Hidden costs in the ROBOT treatment are less than a third of those in the
BASELINE treatment. We can verify whether this drop is significant by
testing whether the indirect effect in the ROBOT treatment is smaller than
or equal to that in the BASELINE treatment.14 Based on the two-sample
one-sided test, this hypothesis is rejected (the Wilcoxon signed rank test has
a p-value below 0.01). The hidden costs of control thus decrease when moving
to an environment where control is not specifically aimed at the agent. Next,
we turn to the ENDOWMENT treatment.
Result 3 Hidden costs of control are significantly lower in the ENDOW-
MENT than in the BASELINE treatment.
14Recall that a smaller indirect effect means larger hidden costs.
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One-third of the subjects voluntarily give more than the required number
of points. Subjects in the role of the agent, however, do no longer choose
a different effort under control and in the absence of control: the left panel
in Figure 3 shows that the distribution of effort is not stochastically smaller
when the agent is controlled. The share of subjects that “punish” the prin-
cipal for controlling is lower than in the BASELINE treatment and their
reduction in effort is smaller too: only 11% exert less effort when being con-
trolled and only about 5% reduce their effort by more than 10—see right
panel in Figure 3. Recall that the indirect effect can be positive if agents
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of effort (left panel) and of within-subject
differences in effort choices for the ENDOWMENT treatment
choose to exert more effort when they are controlled. If the indirect effect is
positive, then there are, of course, no hidden costs of control. This is indeed
the case for the ENDOWMENT treatment: the estimate for the indirect ef-
fect amounts to 6.11 points. If we use the same testing approach as before,
we find that the indirect effect in the ENDOWMENT treatment (and hence
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the hidden costs of control) is significantly lower than in the BASELINE
treatment (Wilcoxon signed rank test has a p-value below 0.01).15
The findings from both treatments mesh well with the idea of legitimacy:
if control is legitimate (according to our definition) then principals are not
punished for controlling. Are principals aware of this?
Result 4 In the ROBOT treatment and in the ENDOWMENT treatment,
principals control significantly more often than in the BASELINE treatment.
In the BASELINE treatment, the principal controls in 23 of 33 cases.
These numbers contrast with the ROBOT treatment, where she controls in
32 out of 33 cases, and the ENDOWMENT treatment, where control happens
in 32 out of 36 cases. Figure 4 depicts the shares of principals that control
for the three treatments. The share in BASELINE is significantly lower than
in ROBOT (p-value for Pearson’s χ2-test: < 0.01) and in ENDOWMENT
(p-value for Pearson’s χ2-test: 0.046). Principals seem to be aware of the
fact that controlling leads to lower costs when control is legitimate.
When interpreting this result, it is important to note that control is at-
tractive in all three treatments: given the actual behavior of agents, control is
an optimal strategy.16 So a significantly larger proportion of principals con-
trols in the ROBOT treatment although control already maximizes surplus in
15The positive sign of the indirect effect is due to a single subject who exerts the maximal
effort when being controlled and no effort otherwise. Excluding this agent from the data
does not change the results: although the indirect effect becomes negative, hidden costs
remain significantly lower in the ENDOWMENT treatment, and the Wilcoxon signed rank
test still has a p-value below 0.01.
16Based on the C10 treatment by F&K, we did not expect control to be optimal in the
BASELINE treatment.
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Figure 4: Control by principals across treatments
the BASELINE treatment. Moreover, more agents anticipate that principals
control in the ROBOT than in the BASELINE treatment:17 in the BASE-
LINE treatment 28 of 32 agents expect the principal to control while all 33
agents in the ROBOT treatment expect to be controlled; these differences
are weakly significant (p-value for Pearson’s χ2-test: 0.06). Likewise more
agents believe that principals control in the ENDOWMENT treatment al-
though the difference is not significant. In the ROBOT and ENDOWMENT
treatment, control is anticipated by the agent and is hence less informative
as a signal of expectations. This may explain why the response of agents to
control is weaker in these treatments than in the BASELINE treatment. We
take this as additional, albeit anecdotal, confirmation that control acts as a
signal of distrust.
17We asked agents what they believed the principal would do. The question was not
salient.
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7 Conclusion
Control can have two types of consequences: the desired direct effect of
preventing a certain behavior and the indirect effect of provoking counter-
productive reactions. We offer a model to examine the interplay of these
two effects. Based on this model, we obtain the predictions that control
provokes less detrimental behavior if it is not aimed at a specific person or
if it protects property. We test these predictions in an experiment. The
predictions are borne out by the data. Our results highlight the fact that
the behavioral consequences of control are specific to the context in which
control is used. Armin Falk and Michael Kosfeld (2006) suggest that control
may be an attractive option for the principal only when it is particularly
effective, in other words, when principals can enforce a high minimum effort
level. In this case, the direct, disciplining effect of control dominates any
other indirect, behavioral response to control. By looking at the two effects
separately, our study uncovers another reason for principals to control: the
detrimental behavioral response to control (the hidden costs) may vanish.
Our experiment demonstrates that hidden costs are minimal if agents do not
take control personally or if they are able to relate to the principal’s decision
to protect her property.
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A Appendix
A.1 Auxiliary results
Lemma 1 In all equilibria, the agent meets the expectations of the principal.
Proof. Consistency requires that the expected values of the agent’s second
order beliefs are identical to that of the principal’s first order beliefs. The
principal’s expectations are thus µnc, µc in equilibrium. Suppose the agent
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chooses a strategy such that x˜i > µi instead of xi = µi. Then, effort costs
increase by x˜i− xi and the deviation is not profitable. On the other hand, if
the agent chooses a strategy x˜i < µi instead of xi = µi, then guilt increases
by more than x˜i − xi and the deviation is also not worthwhile. Thus, the
agent chooses xi = µi and meets the expectations.
A.2 Proof of open- and closed-door equilibria
We present the result and the proof for a more general model. Denote by
xL the lowest possible effort if the principal does not control. Suppose the
principal is only matched with the agent with probability p, receives y with
probability 1− p, and does not know whether she is matched with the agent
while deciding whether to control (y = x) or not (y = xL).
Proposition 4 (Equilibria) There is an open-door equilibrium where the
principal does not control (y = xL) and the agent’s effort matches the agent’s
beliefs (xnc = µnc, xc = µc) if and only if the agent’s beliefs satisfy:
µnc − µc ≥ 1− p
p
(x− xL). (6)
There is a closed-door equilibrium where the principal controls (y = x) and
the agent’s effort matches the agent’s beliefs (xnc = µnc, xc = µc) if and only
if the agent’s beliefs satisfy:
µnc − µc ≤ 1− p
p
(x− xL). (7)
Proof. In any equilibrium, the agent and the principal have correct beliefs.
By Lemma 1 the agent meets expectations, has no profitable deviation, and
plays xnc = µnc and xc = µc. Let us now turn to the principal. The payoff of
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the principal if she controls is: 2 · (xcp+ (1− x)(1− p)). Under no control, it
amounts to: 2 · (xncp+ (1− xL)(1− p)). Accordingly, a deviation to control
in an open-door equilibrium is not profitable if µnc − µc ≥ 1−p
p
(x − xL).
Analogously, a deviation to ‘no control’ in a closed-door equilibrium is not
profitable if µnc − µc ≤ 1−p
p
(x− xL).
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B Instructions for the ROBOT treatment
 1
English Translation of the instructions of the ROBOT treatment 
 
General Instructions for Participants 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. The 
instructions will provide you with all the information you require for participation in the experiment. Please ask 
for assistance if there is something that you do not understand. Your question will be answered at your 
workplace. There is a strict prohibition of communication during the experiment. 
 
You will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euro at the beginning of the experiment. Over the course of the experiment 
you can earn points. This income will be converted into Euro at the end of the experiment. Please note that: 
 
1 point = 10 Cent 
 
The converted income and the show-up fee will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
The  Experiment 
 
In this experiment, each participant A is associated with a participant B in a group of two. No participant knows 
with whom he is associated; all decisions are made anonymously. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, Participant A receives 120 points as an endowment and participant B 
0 points. 
 
Decision of Participant A 
 
Participant A can decide how many points he wants to give to participant B. These points are deducted from  A’s 
endowment, doubled and added to B’s endowment. Each point that A gives to B thus reduces the income of A by 
one point and increases that of B by two points.  
 
After participant A has chosen, the incomes hence amount to: 
 
 Income of Participant A:    120 – chosen points  
 
 Income of Participant B:     0 + 2 *  chosen points 
 
 
The following examples illlustrate the computation of the income: 
Example 1: A gives 0 points (chosen points: 0). Then, A’s income is 120 and B’s 0 points. 
Example 2: A gives 20 points (chosen points: 20). The income is 100 for A and 40 for B. 
Example 3: A gives 80 points (chosen points:80). The income is 40 for A and 160 for B. 
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Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B may require to be given at least 10 points or he can leave the choice of points completely free.  
There are hence two cases: 
  
Case 1: Participant  B requires to be given at least 10 points. Then participant A can chose any (integer) amount 
between 10 and 120 points. In this case the income of B is at least 20 points. 
 
Case 2: Participant B leaves the choice of points free. Then, participant A can chose any (integer) amount  
between 0 and 120 points. In this case the income of B can amount to 0 points.  
 
Decision of Computer Program 
 
A random draw decides whether the decision of participant A has any consequences at all.  With a probability of 
50%, participant A is replaced by a computer program. In this case, participant A’s income is equal to his 
endowment and the income of participant B results from the number of points chosen by the  computer program. 
The program always chooses the smallest possible amount of points, i.e. 10 points if participant B requires at 
least 10 points (case 1) and 0 points if B leaves the choice free (case 2).  
 
Suppose that the program replaces participant A. If B leaves the choice free (case 2), then the program will give 
B the lowest possible amount, i.e. 0 points. The income of B is then 0 points. If B requires to be given at least 10 
points (case 1), the program gives 10 points. In this case, participant B gets at least 20 points. 
  
When participant B decides whether to leave the choice free or not, he does not know whether he faces 
participant A or the program. 
 
The Stages of the Experiment 
 
1. Participant B decides whether to require at least 10 points or leave the choice free. 
 
2. Participant A determines a number of points. If participant B requires at least 10 points (case 1), 
participant A can select a number of points between 10 and 120. If participant B leaves the choice free 
(case 2), participant A can select a number of points between 0 and 120.  
 
3. A random move decides whether participant A or a program determines the income. There is a 
probability of 50% that A’s number of points determines the size of the participants’ income. There is a 
probability of 50% that A keeps his initial endowment and the program determine’s B’s income. If 
participant B requires at least 10 points (case 1), the program gives 10 points and B’s income is 20 
points. If participant  B leaves the choice free (case 2), the program gives 0 points and B’s income 
amounts to 0 points.  
 
4. Participant A and participant B each learn the decision of the other, the result of the draw, and the size 
of the resulting incomes. 
  
Then, the experiment is over.  
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